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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2011, the United States spent $2.7 trillion in health care expenditures, 
accounting for 17.9 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Health care spending 
increased by 3.9 percent in 2011 and is expected to surpass 20 percent of GDP by 2020. 
An investigation of national trends in health spending conducted by the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) estimates that approximately 30 percent of US health expenditures—that 
is, about $750 billion—is wasteful spending. Analysis of spending trends suggests waste 
in health care falls into one of six categories: (1) failures in care delivery; (2) failures in 
care coordination; (3) overtreatment; (4) administrative complexity; (5) pricing failures; 
(6) and fraud and abuse.  
A sustainable level of health spending would be one that grows at the same rate as 
the GDP; this would require cutting health care expenditures by an estimated $2.2 trillion 
by 2020. Distributing these cuts across the spectrum of wasteful spending by specifically 
iv 
 
targeting cost-containment efforts toward those areas of waste, it is possible—albeit 
challenging—to create a more solvent health care system.  
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), landmark 
legislation of the Obama administration, introduced extensive policy changes and 
addressed the unsustainable trajectory of Medicare with the debut of the Accountable 
Care Organization (ACO). The novel ACO design aims to bring hospitals and physician 
groups into partnerships with the common goal of providing quality, affordable care to a 
defined population of patients with the introduction of a Shared Savings Program and a 
triple aim of: (1) improving population health; (2) providing higher quality-care 
experiences; and (3) moderating per-capita health care cost increases.  
The ACO has the potential to address each of the six areas of waste specified by 
the Institute of Medicine, bringing health care expenditures down to sustainable levels, 
while also increasing the quality of care and the efficiency of US health care overall. The 
ACO model is promising, but poses its own challenges as a largely untested health 
system structure, and will require extensive efforts to refine and perfect the model in 
order to be a feasible answer to the US health care crisis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“If we solve our health care spending, practically all of our fiscal problems go away.”1  
 
--Victor Fuchs 
Emeritus professor of economics and  
health research and policy, Stanford University  
 
 In 2011, the United States spent $2.7 trillion in health care expenditures, accounting for 
17.9 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), nearly twice that of other developed 
countries2,3. Health care spending increased by 3.9 percent in 2011 and is expected to surpass 20 
percent of GDP by 20203,4. This rapid growth in spending is not, however, a new challenge. In 
fact, health care expenditures have been rising an average of 2.0 to 2.3 percent each year since 
19502. That health care spending has been an issue facing our nation for such an extensive period 
of time—and has endured various efforts of reform in the interim—provides a sobering 
perspective on the enormity of the challenge.  
 The numbers become even more striking with an evaluation of wasteful spending in 
health care.  An investigation of national trends in health spending conducted by the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) estimates that approximately 30 percent of US health expenditures—that is, 
about $750 billion—is wasteful spending5. Analysis of spending trends suggests waste in health 
care falls into one of six categories: failures in care delivery, failures in care coordination, 
overtreatment, administrative complexity, pricing failures, and fraud and abuse4. The challenge 
becomes greater still when considering the need to increase access and quality in a health care 
system struggling to stay afloat at the status quo. To simultaneously expand the reach of our 
health care system while improving quality and reducing waste, we are in need of revolutionary 
policy changes. 
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Congress arguably needs no convincing to prioritize the matter, as significant reductions 
in health spending would release substantial capital to other areas of national interest, such as 
defense spending, education, and infrastructure development.  But changes in health policy are 
typically painstakingly slow and they can only go so far. Our complex health care system is one 
of multiple payers, but also, multiple players. Governing bodies, providers, and patients alike 
must join together in the effort to create a venue for quality sustainable health care.  
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), landmark legislation of 
the Obama administration, introduced extensive policy changes in an effort to remedy some of 
the issues in health care access, quality, and spending. A major concern of the ACA was the 
unsustainable trajectory of Medicare spending and the need to curb costs as the baby boomer 
generation enters eligibility causing a precipitous rise in the number of Medicare beneficiaries. 
ACA’s proposed solution to this imminent spending crisis is the Accountable Care Organization 
(ACO). The novel ACO design aims to bring hospitals and physician groups into partnerships 
with the common goal of providing quality, affordable care to a defined population of patients. 
The ACO model is well designed to facilitate the dialogue between the three major players: 
governing bodies, physicians, and patients. It also has the advantage of engaging oft-overlooked 
ancillary players, such as social workers, physical and occupational therapists, public health 
professionals, and others with vital roles in the patient experience.  
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Specific Aims 
 The trajectory of health care spending is increasing at unsustainable rates and the quality 
of care is diminishing as physician and hospital budgets are stretched to accommodate greater 
patient populations and increased administrative burdens.  It is the objective of this literature 
review to evaluate the Accountable Care Organization model, as designed by the Centers of 
Medicare and Medicaid Services under the Affordable Care Act, as a vehicle for eliminating 
waste in the United States health care system. The ACO model was designed for the purpose of 
increasing the cost-efficiency of the Medicare payment system, but is well suited for both public 
and private sector health care. It has the potential to address each of the six areas of waste 
specified by the Institute of Medicine: failures in care delivery, failures in care coordination, 
overtreatment, administrative complexity, pricing failures, and fraud and abuse. This paper will 
illustrate how attributes of the ACO model will address each major area of waste within the US 
health care system, bringing health care expenditures down to sustainable levels, while also 
increasing the quality of care and the efficiency of US health care overall.  
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BACKGROUND 
Economic Impact of Health Care 
 The rapid increase in the cost of health care has drastic consequences on the US 
economy; as the percentage of GDP devoted to health care continues to rise, other industries are 
forced to bear some of the burden. The economic impact of health care has been of interest to 
researchers at RAND Health, a division of RAND Corp, the largest independent health policy 
research center in the nation. RAND Health targets much of their research to quality, cost and 
delivery of health care.  
 In 2006, when the percentage of GDP dedicated to health care was 16 percent (compared 
with 17.9 percent in 2011), RAND Health determined that the growth of health expenditures cost 
the broader US economy an estimated 120,000 jobs, over $28 billion in gross output from goods 
and services, and approximately $14 billion in value—that is, the net loss in GDP6. While RAND 
Health has not published updated data, it is reasonable to assume these numbers have seen a 
drastic increase since the economic downturn in 2008 and continued growth in health care 
spending. 
 In our capitalist society that values the competitive marketplace, it can be difficult to 
understand why the health care market does not appear to be self-regulating, as are many 
industries in the US economy. Victor Fuchs, emeritus professor of economics and health policy at 
Stanford University, ascribes the distinction between typical goods and services and those of the 
health care industry as a consequence of the “great uncertainty” and essential nature of health 
care7.  
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The unpredictable and essential nature of health care demands that it not be treated as a 
traditional commodity; it cannot be compared to other goods and services. Fuchs drives this point 
home by relating health care to a personal computer. The challenge of reigning in the cost of 
health care encounters so many obstacles, he says, because developed nations do not deny care 
based on a patient’s ability to pay for services. “The poor who are ill obtain care paid for by 
others. Personal computers are not viewed the same way; if access to a computer were regarded 
as essential, computers would be subsidized for poor individuals”7. While a commodity’s price 
should its real cost of production and real value to the consumer, the nature of goods and services 
in the health care market and the asymmetrical value placed on them by buyers (patients) allow 
for soaring prices in the absence of appropriate legislation to regulate the market7.  
To further illustrate the importance of regulating the health care market, RAND Health 
emphasizes that increased health care costs “force employers to reduce health benefits, cut 
employment, and raise prices, which in turn may lead to lower output and profits”6. As 
unemployment rises and the number of insured Americans falls, the consequences will only 
perpetuate the problem. Uninsured individuals lose access to care resulting in untreated medical 
conditions, public health risks, and loss of preventative opportunities. The cost of caring for these 
individuals is then shifted to the taxpayer as government entities pick up the bill through 
programs like Medicaid, while cost of care increases due to progressed, untreated illnesses.  
 
Waste in Health Care 
 
 In order to control the costs of health care, we must first evaluate current spending trends 
and determine which areas are lacking efficiency or require greater regulation from governing 
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bodies. The major areas of waste in the US health care system can be broken down into six broad 
categories: (1) failures in care delivery; (2) failures in care coordination; (3) overtreatment; (4) 
administrative complexity; (5) pricing failures; and (6) fraud and abuse. 
 
Failures in Care Delivery 
 Failures in care delivery are estimated to cost the US health care system between $102 
billion and $154 billion annually4. Actions that fall under this category are related to “poor 
execution or lack of widespread adoption of known best care processes,” and often result in 
patient injury or poor patient outcome; preventable readmissions are a common result4. It has 
been estimated that preventable hospital readmissions in four US states over the course of a six 
month period resulted in a cost of $730 million to the US health care system8. Missed 
opportunities to save in this category include patient safety guidelines, guidelines for patient 
discharge, tools for identifying high-risk patients, improved follow-up procedures, and 
preventative care.   
 
Failures in Care Coordination 
 Fragmented care results in $25 billion to $45 billion in wasteful spending each year4. 
Care coordination is useful to everyone in health care, but its benefit is most obvious for patients 
with multiple diagnoses and chronic conditions—patients whose health status is most vulnerable 
and whose care ultimately costs the most. Failures in care coordination often result in disease 
complications, increased dependency, decreased functional status, and substantially diminished 
quality of life.    
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 A study by the IOM evaluating medication errors, a preventable offense that comes at a 
great cost, determined that over half of US medication errors occur at interfaces of care, such as 
during a shift-change or the transfer of a patient between departments, and accounted for over 
7,000 deaths annually9. Improved coordination between all levels of health care professionals is 
essential to improving quality and accuracy—and eliminating costly waste—at this level of care.   
 
Overtreatment 
 The practice of Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is the best method for avoiding 
overtreatment, a common err in medical practice that results in an estimated $158 billion to $226 
billion of wasteful spending annually4. This waste is often a result of fee-for-service payment 
systems that encourage a volume-driven system, the practice of “defensive medicine” to avoid 
medical malpractice liability, and other tainted care processes that result in doing more rather 
than doing only what is appropriate. 
An investigation by RAND Corp evaluated the appropriateness of a subset of clinical 
procedures using criteria produced from scientific literature and medical experts; it was shown 
that up to 50% of care delivered was “neither necessary nor appropriate”5.  
 
Administrative Complexity 
 Heavy administrative burdens cause waste by inefficient and misguided protocols created 
by governments and accreditation agencies4. This category of wasteful spending costs the US 
health care system between $107 billion and $389 billion annually4.  Missed opportunities in this 
category include the failure to standardize procedures and forms and the creation of “needlessly 
complex billing procedures”4.   
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Pricing Failures 
 Pricing failures in health care occur due to “the absence of effective transparency and 
competitive markets”4. Lack of regulation in the US health care market has led to rampant 
inflation, as evidenced by large pricing disparities between identical procedures in the US and 
international markets. This area accounts for between $84 billion and $178 billion in wasteful 
spending annually4.  
 
Fraud and Abuse 
 Representing between $82 billion and $272 billion in wasteful spending, this category is 
the result of health care scams, fraudulent billing, and inspection and regulation applied across the 
spectrum of health care due to the “misbehaviors of a very few”4.  
  
Wedges of Waste 
 In its current state, health spending is projected to grow from 17.9 percent of GDP in 
2011 to over 20 percent by 20204. In order to bring health care spending to sustainable levels, the 
rate of growth must be slowed such that it matches the rate of growth of overall GDP. In other 
words, if health spending and GDP grow at the same rate, the percentage of GDP dedicated to 
health care would remain constant.  
 A “Wedges” Model is perhaps the most illustrative schematic to show how the six areas 
of wasteful spending in US health care can address the issue of unsustainable growth in health 
spending; scientists Pacala and Socolow developed this schematic in their investigation of fossil 
fuels and projected levels of atmospheric CO2 emissions4,10. Their model is composed of three 
important components:  
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(1) A “ramped” trajectory representing the status quo10. In the case of health spending, 
this trajectory represents current trends and projected growth in spending. Because 
this is the anticipated course of health spending in the absence of any changes to the 
culture of US health care, it can otherwise be referred to as the “business as usual” 
trajectory4.  
(2) A “flat” trajectory representing stabilization or sustainable levels of health spending 
as a percentage of GDP10. For the purpose of this discussion, this line should closely 
follow the trajectory of GDP4.  
(3) The “stabilization triangle,” or the area between the ramped and flat trajectories10. 
This area represents the amount of spending that must be eliminated in order to 
achieve the flat trajectory. The stabilization triangle can then be divided into 
“wedges” that represent actions that would reduce spending—in the case of US 
health spending, these actions include eliminating waste in each of the six specified 
categories at a rate proportional to their current share of wasteful spending4. 
 
The “Wedges” model of US health spending follows the methods of Pacala and Socolow; 
devised by Berwick, the model (Fig. 1) suggests that the stabilization triangle represents $2.2 
trillion in potential savings between 2012 and 20204. “Eliminating on average an additional 4% of 
this waste each year,” says Berwick, “reaching a 37% reduction in annual theoretical waste by 
2020—would achieve the goal of sustainability over this period”4.   
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Fig. 1. “Wedges” Model for US Health Care. Following methods of Pacala and Socolow, the “wedges” 
model illustrates the need for waste elimination in order to achieve a sustainable level of growth in health 
spending4,10.  The “business as usual” line indicates the projected increase in health spending as a 
percentage of GDP. The flat dotted line represents the trend in health spending that would match the rate of 
growth in GDP bringing health expenditures to sustainable levels. The “stabilization triangle” represented 
by the region in between these two lines has been divided into six segments for each of the six categories of 
wasteful spending in US health care. These wedges represent potential savings in health spending that, if 
eliminated, would help achieve stabilization and sustainable growth. Figure taken from Berwick and 
Hackbarth, 20124.  
 
 
 
 
Barriers to Health Care Financing 
 The IOM has been spearheading a mission to decrease the overall costs of care in the US 
by 10 percent in 10 years. In their discussion, they have identified seven distinct trends in US 
health care that ultimately drive increases in costs. These include: (1) scientific uncertainty; (2) 
misguided economic and practice incentives; (3) system fragmentation; (4) lack of transparency 
in cost, quality and outcomes; (5) trends in national health status; (6) lack of patient engagement; 
and (7) under-investment in public health11. 
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Scientific uncertainty stems from great advancements in science and technology that have 
lead to new pharmaceutical therapies and medical tools at a much faster rate than available 
evidence supporting their use11. In short, while available therapies and treatments abound, much 
is yet to be learned about these advances and the risks and benefits they present. These new 
technologies are often costly to develop and see little financial return due to lack of supporting 
evidence, and therefore have little use (and uncertain value) at the bedside.  
Misguided practice incentives include a fee-for-payment system that encourages a 
volume-driven system and devalues the practice of EBM.  A recent policy forum conducted by 
the American Medical Association (AMA) revealed an interesting finding that many physicians 
believe weighing costs in the process of making clinical decisions is “antithetical to being a 
‘good’ doctor”—a mentality at odds with the fiscal realities that face our health care system and a 
cultural behavior that deserves attention from medical educators and professional societies12. 
Medical malpractice liability and its effect on physician behaviors, as discussed further below, 
also contribute to this barrier to health financing.  
The IOM cites system fragmentation as an issue that can be observed “on virtually every 
dimension—providers, payers, regulators, consumers”11. This pervasive disjunction results in 
inefficient care and increased risks to patients and providers. Lack of communication between 
providers leads to redundant clinical testing, greater opportunity for medical errors, increased 
administrative burdens, and diminished patient satisfaction—all of which contribute to increased 
costs of care11. 
Lack of transparency in health care exerts considerable influence on pricing of goods and 
services. Providers have little reason to keep prices low, as patients seldom pay mind to the actual 
costs of services—but who’s to blame? Headlining stories such as, “What’s the Price? Simple 
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Question, Complicated Answer,” speak volumes of truth to the complexity of our payment 
system13. When reputable websites such as Kaiser Health News have difficulty defining the price 
of services, how are we to expect patients to follow the dialogue? Providers also lack informative 
means of comparing the value of their skills and services to others in their professional circles11. 
Thus any potential for competition in health care is lost and pricing systems go unchecked by the 
forces that would otherwise lead to appreciable self-regulation of the market.  
Evolving trends in the national health status have severe implications for the future 
solvency of the health care system. Currently, 48 percent of Medicare beneficiaries are battling at 
least three comorbidities requiring complex—and costly—care11. As the Medicare-eligible 
population balloons with the aging baby boomer generation, we can expect rapid growth in 
Medicare expenditures to follow. Further complicating the issue, current projections estimate 41 
percent of the population will be clinically obese by 2015, inevitably contributing to increasing 
financial strains with rising rates of diabetes, cancer, and heart disease11.     
Lack of patient engagement in health decisions also has consequences contributing to 
increased costs of care. With up to 40 percent of the population possessing only “basic” health 
literacy, patients are unlikely to encourage value-based decisions11. Further, as societal values 
translate into medical care, patients often forego opportunities for autonomy in the physician’s 
office, ascribing to the notion that “doctor knows best” and the misguided mindset that more is 
always better.  
Finally, the consequences of health behaviors are increasingly evident as rates of obesity, 
sexually transmitted illnesses, and cancer continue to rise. Public health initiatives are 
exceedingly relevant and in desperate need of continued investment. Currently, only 6 percent of 
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health spending is devoted to population health—a startlingly low figure when weighed against 
the potential rewards to health outcomes and, ultimately, health expenditures11.  
  
Barriers to Quality Care 
In a historical report issued by the IOM in 1999, To Err is Human: Building a Safer 
Health System, it was shown that there is an overwhelming need for increased patient protections 
and a measurement system for determining the quality of care. The report revealed some startling 
figures: at least 44,000 deaths annually are the result of medication errors14.  These errors are 
costly, amounting to an estimated $57 billion in annual spending, according to the National 
Quality Forum (NQF), a non-profit organization with a mission to improve transparency, 
accountability and quality in health care15. The IOM categorizes barriers to quality care in three 
ways: (1) overuse; (2) underuse; and (3) misuse16,17.  
 Overuse, defined as receiving treatment of no value, can be caused by failure of providers 
to practice evidence-based medicine (EBM) and also by the practice of “defensive medicine” to 
avoid malpractice litigation. Tenets of evidence-based medicine are now integrated into a vast 
majority of medical school curricula—promising news that the culture of medical practice will 
see drastic change as the theories of this methodology continue to infiltrate the medical 
workforce. Reform of malpractice law will hopefully follow, using EBM as an argument for the 
use of “best practice” guidelines to protect those physicians victimized for the unintended and 
unpredictable consequences of honorable decisions. Additionally, it is estimated that 21% of 
antibiotics are prescribed for conditions for which they are known to be ineffective16. This 
rampant over-prescription of antibiotics has had devastating consequences on quality care leading 
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to the evolution of antibiotic-resistant strains of many deadly microorganisms and posing a 
significant challenge to the pharmaceutical industry in search of novel therapies.  
 The IOM refers to underuse as “failing to receive needed treatment”16. Instances of 
underuse can succinctly be summed up as missed opportunities. This can include failure to 
immunize children with vaccines of proven efficacy, inadequate or untimely prenatal care 
resulting in labor or developmental issues, and undetected or untreated hypertension and mental 
health disorders16. This category can also include missed opportunities for public health 
interventions and preventative care, including screening procedures like mammograms. The IOM 
estimates that failure to receive known effective treatment for acute myocardial infarction results 
in up to 18,000 preventable deaths annually16. Issues of underuse can be ascribed to a wide 
variety of causes including providers that decline to follow “best care” processes and patients that 
are lost to follow-up in a fragmented health care system; these issues are only exacerbated by the 
large population of underinsured and uninsured individuals that often fail to enter the health care 
system until all options for effective care have vanished.  
Errors and defects in treatment, what the IOM refers to as “misuse,” are particularly 
difficult to confront. The physical, emotional, and financial consequences often incurred by the 
patient and family members can be devastating, while providers are faced with guilt, diminished 
confidence in clinical skills, exorbitant legal fees, and threats to their professional licensures, 
among others16. Medical errors persist as a systemic issue in US health care largely because the 
culture of medicine fails to attribute the blame properly. As Berwick puts it, “Most individuals 
still believe that the major cause of bad care is bad physicians,” when in fact, the majority of 
medical errors are results of flaws in systems and processes of care17. It is indeed self-evident that 
avoiding errors at the bedside requires substantial efforts from the provider—certainly, individual 
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efforts to increase patient safety are fundamental to the mission of the medical profession: first, 
do no harm. But in order to make any true impact on the overwhelming problem, it is imperative 
to coordinate a concerted effort; the most effective method of achieving this goal is for leadership 
to take hold of the cause. If patient safety becomes of highest priority to the governing bodies of 
our health system, producing substantial changes in institutional processes and policies, this value 
will naturally flow down to providers, resulting in attainable, meaningful, lasting change in 
bedside practice, and ultimately, in lives saved.  
 
Health Care Reform and Philosophy  
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law on March 23, 
2010 representing the most significant reform of the United States health care system since 
President Lyndon Johnson’s efforts towards the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid in 
196518. Major achievements of the ACA include increased patient protections, such as mandates 
making it unlawful to deny a patient insurance coverage based on a preexisting condition; 
increased access to care in both the public and private sector, including the option for dependents 
to maintain coverage on their parents’ insurance plans until the age of 26 years old; the 
establishment of required quality reports from insurers and providers; the creation of various 
public health initiatives to promote wellness and prevention; and numerous processes aimed to 
reduce health spending including the establishment of a Medicare shared savings program 
(SSP)19. 
 ACA is estimated to extend coverage to 30 million uninsured Americans through 
enrollment in various payment systems, many of which are funded by taxpayer dollars20. This has 
led to heated debate regarding the role of government in health care and which party is ultimately 
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responsible for the costs of medical care: the government or the individual consumer. With health 
care spending already increasing at unsustainable rates, many are concerned that the ACA puts 
our nation in a fragile financial state; at a time when we should be cutting federal expenditures, 
bringing millions of Americans into a publicly funded payer system could have catastrophic 
consequences.  
 Indeed, these concerns are deserving of cautious reflection; a glimpse at health care 
reform under the Reagan administration tells us why. In 1986, President Reagan signed into law 
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). EMTALA was a response 
from Congress to the great public distrust of the medical system due to such issues as denial of 
care and preventable deaths caused by inappropriate transfers of unstable patients. The 
unintended result of EMTALA was the establishment of a “minimum standard: [that] in 
emergency settings, no person, regardless of his or her ability to pay, will be denied initial 
evaluation and basic, lifesaving treatment”21. This effectively extended the reach of the US health 
system to every individual, regardless of citizenship or ability to pay, with little regard for who 
would bear the ultimate financial burden. The aftermath was extensive: 
 [A]s an unfunded mandate for provision of emergency care, EMTALA required initial assessment 
and stabilization of all patients without consideration of insurance coverage. The philosophical 
strengths of this aspect of the law quickly ran afoul of health care financing realities. Under the 
new mandate, hospital emergency departments were acknowledged as a key part of the federal 
safety net, but lack of a fiscal strategy led to an increasing rate of emergency department closures. 
Burdened by increased cost shifting, private and public insurance systems strained to absorb the 
costs of unpaid emergency care and subsequent admissions. Hospitals and physicians risked 
substantial legal and financial penalties for violations of the mandate, with consequences as 
extreme as revocation of a hospital's Medicare provider agreement. Underinsured and uninsured 
patients often faced personal bankruptcy trying to pay health care bills. Through EMTALA, 
Americans have learned that assured access in the emergency department setting does not ensure 
affordability21. 
 
 
The takeaway from this account—that access does not ensure affordability—is of great 
import if we are to evolve a sustainable health care system for all. But there is another lesson to 
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be learned from this misguided policy reform and the disheartening anecdotes of those who 
ultimately paid the price: the disorder of the US health care system is beyond the reach of stopgap 
measures and surface level policy changes—the culture of the entire medical system, from the 
fundamental tenets of medical practice to the patient’s sense of personal responsibility for their 
role in the health care system, requires a radical philosophical shift. 
 
Health Care as a Human Right 
 In 1948, as a response to the abhorrent events in Nazi Germany during World War II, the 
United Nations (UN) put forth the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in order to 
establish an international standard for human rights “grounded in traditions of moral theory”22.  
Two decades later, this document was followed by a treaty—the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—which enumerated various tenets of the 
UDHR, including articles specifically addressing the natural right to health, stating, “The States 
Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health”23. The UN later issued a commentary to aid 
nations in their efforts to implement the standards set forth in the ICESCR, including the human 
right to health: 
 “Health is a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human 
rights. Every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of health conducive to living a life in dignity.”22  
 
 Of the 193 United Nations member states, 160 have ratified the ICESCR treaty. It is 
worth mentioning that, to date, the United States remains one of nine democratic nations that has 
yet to ratify the ICESCR. As a nation that prides itself in the example it sets to the world, defining 
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an unrivaled standard of freedom and opportunity, it is surprising that the United States has failed 
to show adequate support of such a fundamental covenant.  
 While it is reasonable to say that most Americans are supportive of the natural right to 
health, the issue of the right to health care tends to incite great debate. The discussion tends to 
focus on the issue of whether it should be left to government or the individual to “shoulder the 
economic and administrative burdens involved in realizing this particular right”22. If our nation is 
to make any true strides in solving the financial crisis in health care, we must first settle this 
debate.  
 The World Health Organization (WHO) asserts that the right to health demands that 
governments facilitate processes that allow individuals to obtain health; governments must 
“generate conditions in which everyone can be as healthy as possible”24. The WHO claims this 
can be accomplished through a variety of measures such as ensuring safety in the workplace, 
access to adequate food and shelter, and the availability of health services24.  
 Martha Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at 
the University of Chicago, contends that “bodily health” is one of ten basic human capabilities 
“the existence of which exerts moral and political claims upon others to provide the means for 
their actualization”22. Eberl expands on Nussbaum’s idea in his argument for the natural right to 
health care: 
“The first two capabilities listed are life and bodily health. The latter, of course, is 
integral to promoting the former, but it also possesses a more extensive value on its own 
insofar as being healthy also means that one is not suffering from physical disease or 
injury… [S]ociety’s obligation is to equip individuals with the opportunity to avail 
themselves of the tools, with which they are already naturally endowed but may be 
hampered through disease or disabling injury, to be able to choose for themselves which 
fulfilling activities they will engage in for their own and others’ benefit”22.  
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 In short, if our nation is to fulfill its obligation to ensure every individual’s bodily health 
is protected, it requires the establishment of laws entitling citizens of these United States to obtain 
health care in absence of the potential of financial burdens to threaten this right. The most 
financially solvent vehicle to achieve this purpose is the individual mandate.  
 
The Individual Mandate 
 An individual mandate—that is, a requirement by law that every citizen of the United 
States carry health insurance—is by far the most unprejudiced method of achieving a solvent, 
equitable, accessible health care system18. However, the word “mandate” tends to incite fear of 
government infringement on personal rights, thus the idea of an individual mandate has struggled 
to maintain favorable consideration in public opinion.  
 What many opponents of the individual mandate fail to adequately address is the issue of 
the “free rider,” as explained here by Moffitt: 
“Absent a specific mandate for at least catastrophic health insurance coverage, some 
persons, even with the availability of tax credits to offset their costs, will deliberately take 
advantage of their fellow citizens by not protecting themselves or their families, with the 
full knowledge that if they do incur a catastrophic illness that financially devastates them, 
we will, after all is said and done, take care of them and pay all of the bills. They will be 
correct in this assessment. But the rest of us should realize that we are thus being 
victimized by deliberate irresponsibility”25.  
 
 
Moffitt sums up his argument quite succinctly by commenting, “It is idle to talk about 
personal freedom outside of personal responsibility”25. The individual mandate simultaneously 
serves both to protect the individual’s right to health and to shelter the individual from the 
burdens of guaranteeing their fellow citizen that same right. It demands that all citizens are both 
equally entitled to health and obligated to ensure that their own pursuit of that right does not 
preclude the right of their neighbor to do the same.  
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Interestingly, many Americans fail to understand just how much care they ultimately 
fund, for themselves and for others. Health care consumers pay for care through four distinct 
methods: (1) out of pocket costs, including payments toward their deductible; (2) monthly 
insurance premiums deducted from their paychecks at a tax-advantaged rate; (3) foregone income 
that ultimately funds their employer’s contributions to their health insurance plans; and (4) state 
and federal taxes, approximately 20 percent of which funds public programs like Medicaid25,26. 
Most consumers are unaware of methods in which they fund the care of others: through higher 
out-of-pocket costs as the market inflates to offset uncompensated care, through their insurance 
premiums for those whose illnesses result in much higher costs of care than their own, and 
through taxes that finance the care of those in public payer systems25. This method of funding 
health care is what some have come to refer to as a “taxpayer mandate.” Because we fail to hold 
every individual equally responsible for participating in the health care system through an 
individual mandate, the taxpayer inevitably offsets the resultant asymmetrical burden of cost. Yet, 
those who oppose the individual mandate tend to ignore—or are simply unaware—of this 
burdensome mandate already imposed on them by a flawed system. 
 One fundamental issue with the individual mandate that deserves mentioning is its 
incompatibility with the current structure of our medical insurance system. Outdated tax policy 
places limitations on the individual’s options for purchasing health insurance that are absent from 
other insurance markets such as automobile, life, and home insurance. Stipulations of tax codes 
born of wartime economic theory of the 1940s prescribe health insurance be tethered to 
employment in the most restrictive manner; this requires loss of job be followed by loss of 
coverage25. Purchase of private insurance independent from an employer-sponsored plan comes at 
a significantly higher cost, absent the tax advantages received by the employed, to those who can 
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least afford it. In this manner, the individual mandate places an undue burden on the unemployed. 
Significant reform to tax policy and insurance regulation would be imperative for an individual 
mandate to function properly and equitably.  
 Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that an individual mandate will alleviate financial 
stresses on the US health care system across the entire spectrum of the industry at great benefit to 
all parties involved. Expanding the reach of our insurance system also allows a certain amount of 
predictability in the market—an advantage we miss when no one is accountable for such a large 
population of those who receive care. Market predictability lends to stabilization of prices for 
goods and services within the industry and lowers insurance premiums for individuals. Insured 
individuals also have access to primary care, which serves two notable purposes: (1) it stymies 
the frequency of uncompensated emergency department visits for non-acute care allowing the 
emergency room to return its focus to its primary purpose, and (2) it allows for management of 
care, including access to preventative care, which can slow disease progression and allow for 
higher quality, more effective care at significantly less cost21. In short, the domino effect of an all-
encompassing insurance industry is of vital importance to the future security of health care.  
 
The Affordable Care Act  
 The Obama administration set out to design the Affordable Care Act with three distinct 
goals in mind: (1) to expand health insurance coverage to the millions of underinsured and 
uninsured Americans; (2) to develop cost-saving strategies in order to constrain growth in health 
spending; and (3) to increase the security of insurance coverage for individuals with chronic 
illnesses who would otherwise risk facing lifetime caps in coverage of care, loss of portability of 
coverage due to established diagnosis of prior illness, and other issues in retaining appropriate 
financial assistance for their care18.  
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 Reform under the ACA was extensive; much of the new law remains recondite and 
untested, as implementation is ongoing. This paper will focus primarily on aspects of the ACA 
affecting health care financing and quality of care, touching on other details of reform only as 
opportunities arise.  
 
Efforts to Reform Financing 
The ACA addresses health care financing in four ways: (1) an individual mandate; (2) an 
employer mandate; (3) expansion of Medicaid; and (4) insurance reform27.  
The ACA established a requirement that all US citizens maintain a minimum coverage, 
effectively enacting an individual mandate: 
“An applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that 
the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable 
individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month”19.  
 
This clause of the ACA incited considerable resistance from citizens and state governments who 
claimed it was unconstitutional, calling it an excessive use of federal power and an infringement 
of individual rights. Despite this public unrest, on June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the 
law as constitutional under the taxing power bestowed to the federal government, and thus the 
individual mandate stands today. Those who neglect to meet this requirement of minimum 
essential coverage will face tax penalties of up to 2.5% of household income27. Medicaid 
expansion and federal subsidies to aid in the purchase of private insurance are both aimed to help 
low-income individuals meet the requirement.   
 An employer mandate was another major reform of the ACA. Starting in 2014, all 
businesses employing 50 or more full-time workers are encouraged to enroll in an employer-
sponsored health plan that meets the standard of a minimum essential (i.e. catastrophic) 
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coverage27. If employers fail to do so and their employees are subsequently forced to apply for 
federal subsidies for the purchase of private insurance, the employer would then face a financial 
penalty; employers are not subject to penalty if their workers to do not apply for these subsidies. 
This exception provides a loophole, however the penalty effectively functions as an employer 
mandate in order to prevent employers from leaving their workers to seek public funding for 
coverage. The ACA also provided the incentive of tax credits of up to 35% for small businesses 
(less than 25 employees) to alleviate financial stresses should they elect to enroll in employer-
sponsored health plans19.  
 Expansion of Medicaid, another major reform of the ACA, caused great disturbance 
among state governments. Medicaid is currently run independently by the states with some 
oversight by CMS that enables the states to receive partial federal funding for their programs. 
Historically, in order for states to receive federal reimbursements, state Medicaid programs were 
required to provide eligibility criteria to include a minimum of: (1) members of low-income 
families with children, (2) elderly individuals with incomes at 75% of the poverty level, and (3) 
disabled individuals; all other criteria were at the states’ discretion18. The ACA initially mandated 
that all states expand their Medicaid programs by loosening the eligibility requirements to include 
all individuals, regardless of health status or family circumstance, that fall below 133 percent of 
the poverty level18. This mandate was expected to bring an estimated 16 million uninsured 
individuals into public sector coverage, placing a considerable financial burden on both state and 
federal governments18. Many state governments were understandably threatened by this 
diminution of their powers and the matter was eventually brought to the Supreme Court where 
Medicaid expansion was ruled unconstitutional28. Under this ruling, the law was reconciled and 
states may now maintain current coverage or opt to expand their Medicaid programs and receive 
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increased federal assistance; this flexibility makes projections of cost and coverage difficult and 
thus the future solvency of the Medicaid program remains largely ambiguous at this stage.  
 Finally, the ACA approached the issue of private medical insurance from a variety of 
angles. One reform effort allows for dependents age 26 and younger to remain on their parents’ 
insurance policies, while others served to eliminate life-time caps on insurance payouts and 
prevent insurance agencies from denying payment or coverage based on the existence of a prior 
condition19. Another provision of the ACA allowed for a strategic change to the structure of the 
insurance industry by establishing state-based insurance exchanges; these exchanges will serve as 
a marketplace to the uninsured looking to purchase an insurance policy in order to meet the 
individual mandate27. As the individual mandate goes into effect in 2014, these exchanges will 
likely encounter growing pains, but many remain hopeful for their success citing this reform as 
“substantial progress in supporting and empowering patients by reorienting state agencies to 
become active advocates for their citizens”29.  
 
Efforts to Improve Quality of Care 
 
 The ACA addresses the issue of quality in health care from several angles, a promising 
sign that we may be entering a new era of medicine that emphasizes value and minimizes harm. 
Efforts to increase quality in health care are demonstrated in four major ways in the ACA: (1) 
relegating duties to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) with 
a focus on quantifying and improving quality in care; (2) increased transparency in medicine 
through establishment of quality measures and mandated quality reports; (3) investment in 
Comparative Effectiveness Research; and (4) investment in innovation, including the 
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establishment of the CMS Innovation Center and the development of novel primary care delivery 
models.  
 The Secretary of DHHS was granted a great deal of authority through the ACA to 
advance the mission of quality in health care; the Secretary has been afforded the powers to 
establish system-wide goals, set quality standards, create guidelines for insurance agencies, 
allocate grant money to states for developing insurance exchanges, and collect penalties, among 
others19. In 2011, the Secretary moved for the establishment of the Partnership for Patients under 
the CMS, a public-private partnership with a membership currently totaling 3,700 hospitals 
nation-wide30. The Partnership was devised to promote collaboration between patients, hospitals 
and community care facilities to accomplish two main goals: (1) to make care safer, with the 
precise aim to decrease preventable hospital-acquired conditions by 40 percent; and (2) to 
improve transitions in care and thereby reduce preventable hospital readmissions by 20 percent30.   
 Efforts to increase transparency in medicine led the ACA to establish provisions by 
which DHHS can assess physician and hospital performance. One such measure will be used to 
determine an overall “hospital performance score” that will then allow patients, payers, and 
governing agencies a standard by which they can evaluate an institution on quality from a 
national perspective19. This increased transparency will almost certainly serve to promote 
competition between providers and hospitals on the regional level with a potential to alleviate 
market stresses.  
The ACA also calls for increased support to Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER) 
to aid physicians and patients in the process of making a clinical decision19. Efforts to expand 
CER resources have been largely encouraged by the IOM with the hope that the data provided 
will allow physicians to engage their patients in discussions of value-based care. Approximately 
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$1.1 billion have been allocated to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Agency for 
Healthcare Research & Quality (AHRQ), the institutions charged with the responsibility of 
delivering CER that serves four purposes: (1) provides information that can be used “on the front 
lines of treatment;” (2) helps clinical decisions become consistent, transparent and rational; (3) is 
widely disseminated and used; and (4) promotes collaboration and discussion of comparative 
effectiveness11.  
 The AHRQ has been touting another provision of the ACA for its innovative approach to 
primary care. The Patient Centered Medical Home (PCMH) is one new model of care delivery 
that targets patients with a high use of health services, such as patients with chronic illnesses, in 
order to provide them with highly coordinated, efficient care31. The PCMH is designed to provide 
care that is: (1) comprehensive (offers a majority of specialty services); (2) patient-centered 
(facilitates relationship between provider and patient); (3) coordinated (a health care team that 
works together for a common goal); (4) accessible (with an emphasis on ease of navigation); and 
(5) high quality and safe (appropriate, timely, and evidence-based care)32. A pilot program at 
Geisinger Health, the major health system serving central and northeastern Pennsylvania, has 
seen significant success since its launch, citing that 24-hour access has increased the rate at which 
patients claim their primary care physician as their usual source of care over the emergency room 
(83% versus 68% prior to launch of the PCMH)33.  
 Finally, as an additional investment in innovation of primary care, the ACA established 
the CMS Innovation Center with a primary goal of devising new models of care that will serve 
the Medicare and Medicaid populations with greater efficiency and better outcomes than current 
fee-for-service models19. The Accountable Care Organization (ACO) is one such model designed 
to answer this calling and will be discussed at great length in the pages that follow. 
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Accountable Care Organizations 
The Accountable Care Organization model is designed to promote partnerships between 
hospitals, physician groups, and other health care providers in order to facilitate coordinated, 
efficient, patient-centered care. The model that is most evolved to date is that designed with 
Medicare patients in mind, and it is that model that will be evaluated here; it should be noted 
however, that there are Medicaid ACOs and public ACOs currently being designed and piloted. 
Because Medicare ACOs are further along in the development process, the lessons learned from 
their progress will be applicable to the further evolution of the broader ACO model.  
While the ACO concept has experienced a great deal of interest from motivated leaders in 
health administration, the model itself presents a challenge due to lack of supporting data. The 
ACO design being implemented today is, in fact, a second-generation model of the Physician 
Group Practice Demonstration (PGPD)—a pilot program initiated by Congress in 2000 and the 
only source of empirical evidence for the model’s utility34. The data collected from this 
demonstration will be presented and discussed, but the ACO model will be defined in terms of 
goals, design, governance, and fiscal considerations.  
Currently, physicians caring for Medicare patients receive payments from Medicare on a 
fee-for-service basis and, because Medicare reimbursement rates are typically substantially lower 
than the rate a provider might receive from a private insurer, there is little financial incentive to 
devote a great deal of time or effort in managing the complex care of the average Medicare 
patient. Hospitals and physician groups that choose to participate in a Medicare ACO are charged 
with the responsibility of coordinating care for a specified population of Medicare beneficiaries 
on a unique reimbursement scheme called a Shared Savings Program (SSP). Under the SSP, an 
ACO will be assigned a patient population and the annual cost of care for that population will be 
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estimated based on Medicare reimbursement rates for the distribution of diagnoses in that 
population and the prospect for new diagnoses35. If the ACO is able to successfully care for these 
patients at a reduced cost than that estimated by Medicare reimbursement rates, while meeting a 
list of quality measures determined by CMS, then the ACO will share those savings with 
Medicare35.  
 
ACO Triple Aim 
The ACO model was designed with a so-called “triple aim” to achieve three primary 
goals: (1) improved population health; (2) higher quality-care experiences; and (3) moderation of 
per-capita health care cost increases36,37. As an integrated care delivery model, hospitals and 
physician groups that participate in these partnerships will be expected to coordinate their 
operations on all levels of care—that is, funding, administration, organization, service delivery, 
and clinical care—with the hope that this multi-level integration will produce the highest degree 
of health outcomes and system productivity38.  
 
Improved Population Health 
 An essential tenet of the ACO is its focus on a defined population of patients. The benefit 
of managing the care of a predetermined population is easily seen in traditional managed care 
models like the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO).  While the HMO model receives 
criticism for its payer-provider relationship that at times limits physician choice, the aspect that 
makes it economically attractive is the ability to evaluate the broad population of patients and 
prospectively plan for their treatment18. In essence, the idea of managed care is to limit the 
unpredictable nature of health care as much as possible so that funding for care can be 
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approached creatively with the mindset of delivering quality care efficiently39. Similarly, if there 
are trending morbidities in the population, public health interventions can be targeted to specific 
health behaviors in order to confront the issue from a preventative approach.  
 
Higher-Quality Care Experiences 
 The CMS has developed a set of 33 quality care measures that span four domains of 
practice: (1) patient-provider experience; (2) care coordination and patient safety; (3) preventive 
care; and (4) care of at-risk populations (See Appendix 1)40. The number of quality measures met 
determines the percentage of shared savings the ACO is eligible to receive40. The list is extensive 
and has been the topic of debate among critics of the ACO model; many ACOs in the beginning 
stages of implementation struggled to meet every quality measure and called for more attainable 
goals. CMS responded to this by reducing the quality measures from 65 to 33 in the ACO Final 
Rule35. Even so, the struggle to meet quality measures continues to incite contention, despite the 
fact that the measures were developed from best care processes with EBM at their core. EBM is 
the great normalizer; it derives its power as a quality measure from its ubiquitous applicability. If 
quality is derived from EBM, then every interface of care, nation-wide, should be subject to that 
same standard41. 
 
Moderation of Per-Capita Cost Increases  
The Shared Savings Program is designed to present providers with an incentive to steer 
away from the traditional volume-driven fee-for-service payment scheme35. The culture of health 
care today provides little motivation for a provider to approach care with the mindset of “less is 
more,” but the SSP is designed to encourage the practice of EBM and more coordinated, cost-
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effective care. If the financial incentive lies on the side of doing only what is appropriate, 
promoting provider collaboration, and avoiding redundancy, then perhaps we can generate a shift 
in provider behaviors that will result in efficient, higher-value care39.   
 
ACO Design and Hierarchy  
The CMS currently has several tiers of ACO models designed for a term of three years; 
an ACO may select their program depending on the organization’s stage of development, the 
amount of risk they wish to take on, and the capital investments they have available to them. An 
emerging ACO may participate in a Track model, while an ACO that participated in the PGPD 
may elect to participate in a Transition ACO42. An organization that is highly experienced in 
integrated care models may choose a Pioneer ACO model43. An emerging ACO requiring more 
financial assistance with start-up costs may opt for the Advanced Payment model42. Pioneer, 
Transition and Advanced Payment models each have their merits, but are beyond the scope of this 
discussion; the focus here will be on Track models for emerging ACOs.  
 
Track Models 
  There are currently two separate tracks that an emerging ACO may elect to take; the 
Track 1 and Track 2 models differ in the amount of financial risks and rewards involved in their 
design and agreement with CMS (see Table 1). For example, the Track 1 model has a potential to 
receive up to 50 percent of the shared savings, but minimizes risk by not sharing in losses 
throughout the term of the three-year program42. Meanwhile, the Track 2 model has a greater 
potential reward of up to 60 percent of shared savings, but takes on a greater risk by sharing 
losses all 3 years of participation42.  
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 The CMS has further defined the SSP by establishing a Minimum Savings Rate (MSR). 
The MSR defines that a minimum savings must be demonstrated before any sharing occurs; the 
greater the population served by the ACO, the less the MSR may be42. As an example, an ACO 
may be required to reduce costs of care for their Medicare patient population by 5 percent before 
they receive a portion of the savings. Once this MSR has been achieved, they will share in 
savings with Medicare on a first-dollar basis35.  
 
Table 1. A comparison of Track 1 and Track 2 ACO Models.  
 
 Track 1 Track 2 
Potential for shared savings 
and shared losses 
Potential for shared savings in all 
3 years; no share in losses 
Potential for shared savings and 
losses in all 3 years 
 
Potential for shared losses None Year 1 – 5 % 
Year 2 – 7.5% 
Year 3 – 10% 
Minimum savings rate 
(MSR) 
2% to 3.9% (3.9% for ACOS 
with 5000 beneficiaries) 
2% 
Maximum shared savings 
and cap on savings 
Up to 50% of amount of costs 
below benchmark plus 2.5% for 
serving RHC and FQHC 
populations;  
Cap of 7.5% of benchmark 
Up to 60% of amount below 
benchmark plus 5% for serving 
RHC and FQHC populations;  
Cap of 10% benchmark 
 
Bonus for beneficiaries who 
use RHCs or FQHCs 
2.5% 5% 
Emerging ACOs may select a Track 1 or Track 2 model depending on the balance of risk and reward they 
are seeking. Track 1 ACOs take on less risk with the potential for less reward, while Track 2 models accept 
greater risk with the potential for greater reward. MSR is Minimum Savings Rate; RHC is Rural Health 
Center; FQHC is Federally Qualified Health Center. Table compiled from data in Correia and Berwick35,42. 
 
Population Coverage and Rostering 
 The patient population for a Medicare ACO is determined by a patient’s primary care 
provider for the year preceding the upstart of the ACO. The CMS Final Rule for ACOs has 
devised a two-step patient assignment process: (1) if a beneficiary has received care from more 
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than one primary care provider, the patient will be assigned to the ACO of the physician 
providing the majority of their care services; (2) if a beneficiary has not received any services 
from a primary care provider, the patient will be assigned to an ACO based on services provided 
by any other ACO professional (including specialty providers)35.  
 A point of contention for many critics of ACOs has been that Medicare beneficiaries may 
be enrolled in an ACO without their knowledge since assignment is based purely on the 
provider’s participation in an ACO and not on patient-initiated enrollment44. As a result, 
physicians are now required to notify their patients upon the initial upstart of the ACO and inform 
them of the reorganization of their care, providing the patient with an opportunity to seek care 
from a non-ACO provider if they so choose35.  
 
Quality Care Measures 
 The CMS Proposed Rule for ACOs originally called for 65 distinct quality measures 
spanning five domains; this list was deemed burdensome and largely unattainable by early critics 
of the ACO model. The Final Rule responded to this by narrowing the list to 33 measures in four 
domains: (1) patient-provider experience; (2) care coordination and patient safety; (3) preventive 
care; and (4) the care of at-risk populations. CMS has developed a two-tier system for assessing 
quality on these 33 measures: during the first year, an ACO will receive shared savings based on 
reporting of the measures; during the second and third years, performance measures will be 
phased in along with reporting35. In other words, for the first year, the ACO’s eligibility for 
shared savings does not reflect their performance on quality measures—they are only required to 
account for the current status of each measure35. Reporting of quality measures can occur in a 
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variety of media including patient surveys, insurance claims data, and patient chart data (see 
Appendix 1)45.  
 
Benchmarks 
 The SSP relies heavily on benchmarking data to establish clear criteria for what qualifies 
as reduced costs of care. The benchmark provides an estimate of the total predicted cost of caring 
for the specified population of patients in absence of the ACO; this estimate is based on the 
standard Medicare fee-for-service reimbursements and accounts for population characteristics 
that could potentially increase the costs of care45. When determining whether care of the 
Medicare patient population has been successfully reduced, total ACO expenditures are evaluated 
against this benchmark44.  
 
Governance 
While an ACO can be composed of multiple institutions such as hospitals and physician 
groups, the establishment of a “separate legal entity,” such as a non-profit organization, must 
occur to serve as the governing body of the ACO42. This legal entity is responsible for distributing 
shared savings among ACO participants and must have a structure of shared governance in which 
each participant maintains proportionate control over decision making processes42. Additionally, 
participants are required to maintain at least 75 percent control of the organization and 
beneficiaries are required to have a role in governance. In other words, if an ACO is composed of 
one hospital and two physician groups, their board of directors might include 8 members with two 
representing the hospital, two each representing the two physician groups, and two beneficiaries. 
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The ACO participants would thus have proportionate control and maintain a cumulative 75 
percent control with the beneficiaries having 25 percent control.  
 
Antitrust Law 
 Many concerns have been raised that the conglomeration of health care providers into 
ACOs would provide them with substantial market power, diminishing the potential for 
competition and subsequently driving prices higher with catastrophic consequences for our health 
care system. This concern was put to rest by the Federal Trade Commissioner (FTC) and 
Department of Justice (DOJ) with the application of a unique antitrust law; the ACO will be 
evaluated based on “common services” provided by participants in a single ACO42. If the total 
market share for that service is determined to be less than 30 percent within the geographical 
area, the ACO is within the bounds of antitrust law42. If the total market share is above this range, 
the ACO may be subject to review by the appropriate governing agencies42.  
 
Physician Group Practice Demonstration 
 In 2000, a directive from Congress resulted in the initiation of the Physician Group 
Practice Demonstration (PGPD) in which Medicare providers were presented with financial 
incentives in the form of shared savings for providing high-quality care at a reduced cost46. The 
Demonstration included 10 large physician group practices (PGPs), 8 with distinguished 
reputations in integrated care models; PGPs could receive up to 80 percent of the savings if they 
were able to meet 32 quality goals and reduce costs of care by at least 2 percent46–48.  
 The results from this demonstration provided the framework on which today’s ACO 
model is based and this is the only longitudinal study providing observational evidence for the 
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model’s utility in today’s health system. Each PGP was evaluated in comparison to a control 
population of Medicare beneficiaries not assigned to a participating PGP; the cost of care from 
participating PGPs was measured using this control group as a benchmark in order to be eligible 
for shared savings47. Fortunately, the participating PGPs saw significant success in improving 
quality during their five years in the program with all 10 groups meeting at least 29 of the 32 
quality measures by the fourth year of participation and 7 groups meeting all 32 measures by the 
fifth year46.  
 A 2011 CMS report indicates that after five years, participating PGPs were able to 
increase their quality scores from baseline performance by an average of 11 percent on diabetes 
measures, 12 percent on heart failure measures, 6 percent on coronary artery disease measures, 9 
percent on cancer screening measures, and 4 percent on hypertension measures49.  While the 
PGPD appears to have demonstrated considerable progress in quality of care, the results are less 
promising for the ability of the model to achieve a cost savings. An analysis of pre-PGPD costs 
and post-PGPD costs for participating PGPs and control populations reveals significant room for 
improvement in cost-containment processes.  
 CMS estimated that the overall savings of the five-year demonstration amounted to $137 
billion, however some question whether this might have been an overestimation due to the 
methods used for risk-adjustment48. Further, the data indicate that savings were most notable in 
patients that were dually eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid services, while patients that 
were only eligible for Medicare saw modest to no savings48. The dually eligible population saw 
an average savings of $532 per beneficiary, while the nondually eligible population experienced 
an average of just $59 in annual savings; averaged over the total population of dually and 
nondually eligible beneficiaries, this amounts to a savings of $114 per beneficiary (Figure 2)48. 
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The data suggest that a considerable proportion of the savings was due to decreased 
hospitalizations due to high quality care for the vulnerable dually eligible population, while many 
groups saw increased spending during the shift away from fee-for-service payment48. This data 
provides an informative, though complex, perspective on the promise of the ACO framework to 
simultaneously increase quality of care and decrease overall health expenditures.  
The PGPD is also useful for the feedback from the participating PGPs on the design 
issues they experienced during the program. In devising the ACO model, CMS ardently referred 
to this feedback and adjusted specifications as appropriate. Additionally, the PGPD served as a 
promising indication of rising interest in improving quality and controlling health care 
expenditures, with many of the participating PGPs citing that their involvement in the 
demonstration was motivated by their “belief that this is the right thing to do for patients, and [it 
aligned] with their mission and vision of the future of health care”47.  
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Figure 2. Medicare spending per beneficiary in Physician Group Practice Demonstration and 
Control Populations. Mean Medicare spending per beneficiary for PGPD participants and local control 
groups. Dotted vertical line indicates initiation of the PGPD in April 2005. Dually eligible beneficiaries 
include those patients eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid services; nondually eligible beneficiaries are 
those patients eligible only for Medicare services. Annual savings from the PGPD were significant only for 
the dually eligible beneficiaries with an adjusted mean savings of $532 per beneficiary; nondually eligible 
beneficiaries saw an adjusted mean savings of just $59 annually48. Figure taken from Colla et al48.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
As of October 2012, there were 153 Medicare ACOs in various stages of development 
spanning the spectrum of models available; over 400 other organizations had also expressed 
intention to begin transitioning to an ACO model in the near future43. Additionally, there are 
currently between 150 and 200 private ACOs at various stages of development43. This abounding 
interest is evidence of the compelling changes occurring within the culture of medicine and the 
desire to enhance the overall health care experience. Certainly, the wastefulness and inefficiency 
of our health care system wears heavily on the medical workforce as it does on the patients it 
serves. We have now reached a pivotal juncture at which we must harness the rising momentum 
of the individual parties and collectively push forward into an era of accountable care. 
 
Addressing the Wedges of Waste 
 Recall that the trajectory of health care spending in Berwick’s Wedges model results in a 
“stabilization triangle” representing an estimated $2.2 trillion in unsustainable spending4. The 
ACO model has unrivaled potential to address each wedge of the stabilization triangle in order to 
stabilize the trajectory of health spending.   
 The first three areas of waste—failures in care delivery, failures in care coordination, and 
overtreatment—are each addressed in the four domains of quality measures embedded in the 
ACO model: (1) patient/caregiver experience; (2) care coordination and patient safety; (3) 
preventative health; and (4) at-risk populations. The governance and financial aspects of the 
model also improve each of these areas of waste. The remaining three areas—administrative 
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complexity, pricing failures, and fraud and abuse—are more directly influenced by other aspects 
of ACO design and indirectly impacted by quality measures.  
 
Failures in Care Delivery 
  Issues in care delivery are addressed in the patient/caregiver experience domain through 
measures of access to specialists, timeliness of care, provider communication skills, health 
promotion, and functional status. In the care coordination/patient safety domain, measures of 
medication reconciliation and fall risks can improve care delivery by decreasing the rate of 
hospital-acquired conditions. The preventative health domain has great potential for decreasing 
failures in care delivery by encouraging immunizations, promoting management of body mass 
index (BMI) and hypertension, and incentivizing multiple screening efforts such as breast cancer, 
colorectal cancer, and psychological disorders. Perhaps the most efficacious domain for 
addressing issues of care delivery is the at-risk population domain, which contains several 
measures of “all-or-none” scoring. For example, there are six individual measures for the at-risk 
population of diabetes patients; five of the measures are denoted “all-or-nothing,” indicating that 
all five of those measures must meet quality standards or the ACO receives no savings based on 
the those specific measures45. Both of the measures for coronary artery disease also follow all-or-
nothing scoring methods. This strategy provides stark motivation to improve follow-up care of 
these vulnerable patients and focus on treating the whole patient rather than a single clinical 
observation or lab value.  
 Additionally, the ACO goal of improved population health, facilitated through patient 
rostering methods and population management, will serve to promote provider investment in care 
prevention and chronic disease management. Rather than treating illness as it presents, providers 
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will be encouraged to educate and empower patients, to expand preventative services, and to 
engage in shared decision making with a focus on value-based care. 
 
Failures in Care Coordination 
 Failures in coordination are addressed in the patient/caregiver experience domain through 
measures of access to specialists, timeliness of care, information provided to patients, and shared 
decision-making processes. In the care coordination/patient safety domain, the “all condition 
readmission” measure places necessary emphasis on the issue of hospital readmissions. An 
estimated 2.3 million Medicare beneficiaries experienced readmissions within 30 days of 
discharge in 2003 and 2004; this area of failure is predicted to provide an opportunity of $1.9 
billion in annual savings for Medicare patients alone50.  CMS provides the clinical 
recommendation of holding pre-discharge assessments and improving follow-up care methods to 
address readmission rates45. Additional care coordination measures include promotion of 
electronic health records, disincentives for hospital admissions of vulnerable patients—such as 
those diagnosed with heart failure or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease—in order to promote 
case management processes45. Medication reconciliation and fall risks are also a major 
component of care coordination with large potential cost and quality benefits. In the preventative 
health domain, BMI management, clinical depression screening, and tobacco cessation 
interventions each have components of follow-up care, which will also aid in addressing failures 
of care coordination. Finally, the at-risk population domain relies heavily on exemplary 
coordination of care and each of the clinical measures in this domain will be heavily influenced 
by devotion to interdisciplinary, team-based integrated care. 
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 Shared governance and emphasis on population management will also likely have a 
positive influence on coordination of care, resulting in more efficient professional practices and 
inter-organizational communication and record-keeping strategies. A substantial opportunity for 
savings in this category is reduced redundancy of clinical diagnostic tests and imaging studies.    
 
Overtreatment 
 A notable quality measure with the potential to decrease overtreatment is the measure of 
provider communication in the patient/caregiver domain. This measure implies the need for better 
communication between patient and provider as well as between multiple providers on an 
interdisciplinary care team. Team-based decisions are likely to discourage practice of defensive 
medicine as providers are afforded security in the ultimate consensus of multiple professional 
opinions. Further, a healthy interdisciplinary approach enhances provider creativity and problem 
solving with a potential to find effective, cost-reducing methods of care.  
 Additionally, the major remedy for overtreatment issues is integrated into every detail of 
the ACO model; the volume-driven, fee-for-service mindset of contemporary medical practice 
will be dissolved by the Shared Savings Program and the shift toward value-driven care.  
 
Administrative Complexity 
 The shared-governance structure of the ACO presents a challenge to conquering issues 
with administrative complexity. ACOs will require creativity in order to streamline processes and 
reduce administrative burdens. Inter-organizational standardized billing procedures and electronic 
health records are deserving of further development in order to see improved efficiency in this 
complex model of care delivery. After the initial growing pains subside and procedural “kinks” 
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are minimized, this area of wasteful spending has a potential to provide many opportunities for 
cost savings. Additionally, as care coordination efforts improve and readmission rates, medical 
errors, and malpractice risks decline, the natural progression will result in decreased 
administrative burdens that result from lack of standardized care processes and inefficiencies in 
care.  
 
Pricing Failures 
 The ACA holds many opportunities to address pricing failures in the health care market, 
including public access to quality measures and the nationally standardized “hospital performance 
score.” These efforts will be multiplied as competition gains ground in the ACO marketplace. 
Medical manufacturers and suppliers will begin to engage in pricing battles to score lucrative 
contracts with successful ACOs, and ACOs will have enough market power to make bold 
negotiations with a great potential to provide stability to this volatile market. The future of 
capitalism in health care is indeed an exciting prospect and as patient education continues to 
promote value-based health care decisions, a balance will begin to be restored to this historically 
asymmetrical marketplace. 
 
Fraud and Abuse 
 As a more ambiguous source of waste in US health care, it is difficult to estimate how 
this area of wasteful spending will directly benefit from the ACO model. Opportunities for 
savings will be most easily attained through professional checks and balances; as organizations 
begin to integrate their care delivery methods, opportunistic frauds will be more cautious of 
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watchful eyes, providers with a tendency to overprescribe and over-treat will be dis-incentivized 
by shared decision making processes and organizational initiatives towards value-based care.  
 
 These six areas of wasteful spending in US health care hold endless opportunities for 
improving the mechanisms of care delivery and decreasing overall health expenditures. Perhaps 
the most evocative aspect of the ACO design and its approach to care delivery is the initiation of 
a persistently dynamic process of improved quality and increased cost containment. As each 
individual attribute of the ACO design approaches maturity and undiminished productivity, the 
advantages will continually fall toward higher quality, more efficient, value-based care processes. 
A RAND Health report on payment reform devised a schematic to represent this powerful 
relationship (Figure 3); they demonstrate that quality and cost containment are symbionts, each 
drawing life from the other51. As quality goals are achieved, cost containment goals become more 
attainable; likewise, as costs are controlled, there is natural promotion of quality. This mutually 
effectual relationship works both ways however, and the great challenge in US health care rests in 
halting the downward spiral and turning a diseased system into a thriving, efficient health care 
market.  
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Figure 3. Mutually beneficial relationship between cost containment and quality goals in payment 
reform. Schematic demonstrates dynamic relationship between efforts to improve quality and cost 
containment in US health care. FFS is fee-for-service. From RAND report on payment reform51. 
 
Issues in Financing 
Many health care professionals and insurance companies are frustrated by what they 
consider to be burdensome quality reports; some consider this to be a bureaucratic 
micromanagement of health care that adds to administrative complexity and tedium and pulls 
clinicians away from the bedside. However, quality reports that are made available to the 
consumer (the patient) infuse the competitive spirit of American capitalism into an industry that 
has been lacking the balance provided by informed buyers. Physicians that perform well on 
quality reports will conceivably see rewards as their clientele increases, while those that perform 
poorly will be forced to respond to the market demands and increase the quality of the care they 
provide in order to remain competitive. Restoring this balance to the health care market could 
provide much-needed stabilization to the costs of medical goods and services. 
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Benchmarking has presented another challenge for CMS as many ACO administrators 
feel the current process places an undue burden on an ACO to compare their costs of care 
delivery to a national benchmark, ignoring regional pricing disparities and local market pressures. 
ACOs in regions of substantially inflated markets will see greater challenges in reducing costs 
than others, placing them at a disadvantage for receiving shared savings. CMS argues that all 
ACOs in the region will experience these same challenges and therefore the risk is standardized 
within the local market, nevertheless, further attention to benchmarking processes is warranted to 
alleviate the concerns of emerging ACOs and encourage smaller organizations to take risks in a 
potentially volatile market.  
 Finally, an issue that has yet to be resolved by CMS relates to tracking costs as patients 
migrate through the broader US health care system. Under Medicare law, beneficiaries are 
afforded the flexibility to select any provider they wish and can change providers at any time. 
However, the rostering process provided by the ACO Final Rule delineates that ACOs will be 
assigned Medicare beneficiaries based on the primary care provider for the year prior to the 
ACO’s upstart. This implies that an ACO will be held accountable for health outcomes for 
patients that might have crossed through their system prior to organization of the ACO, whether 
or not that patient’s care is still being managed by a professional belonging to that specific ACO. 
Insofar as this could negatively influence an ACO’s eligibility to receive shared savings, the 
concern is understandable and is deserving of attention from the appropriate governing bodies.  
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Issues in Quality Care 
 A significant issue observed in the PGPD was the temptation of providers to focus their 
clinical efforts strictly on the quality measures in the ACO Final Rule and to neglect other care 
processes not specifically measured and incentivized. In other words, there is a risk of “teaching 
to the test,” whether conscious or not, where providers are likely to modify behaviors in order to 
optimize their percentage of shared savings while potentially ignoring other vital aspects of care 
that produce little to no financial gain.  
 Another shortcoming of the ACO model is the lack of community care promotion. Many 
community health centers are troubled by the ACO model and what they presume to be a shift 
toward conglomerates of health care providers. This could potentially leave community centers 
struggling to negotiate prices with manufacturers and suppliers, in addition to eliminating 
necessary access to specialty care and diagnostic services. CMS should devote additional 
consideration to the needs of community health centers, paying mind to their vital role in 
promoting population health and providing essential care to underserved populations. Proper 
support of these community centers could provide many opportunities for cost containment, most 
notably in the realm of preventative care and case management of vulnerable patient populations.  
 
Responsibility of the Governing Bodies 
 It is clear that the task at hand presents a sizable challenge to our nation requiring the 
efforts of every party involved. While the ACO model provides a framework for reducing waste, 
there are many other aspects of the health care system requiring attention in order for the ACO 
model to work effectively. Governing bodies, providers and patients each have a part to play in 
molding a more efficient, higher-quality health care system. Governing bodies—to include 
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DHHS, CMS, and leaders in health care administration—need to prioritize and facilitate a culture 
shift that values EBM, promotes value-based decisions, and encourages a pay-for-performance 
mentality with a focus on population health.  
Governing bodies also have a responsibility to providers to reduce red-tape that prevents 
physicians from focusing on patient care—excessive paperwork, administrative complexity that 
adds to cost and diminishes workflow efficiency, and unmitigated risk of medical malpractice 
suits. Many physicians are calling for malpractice reform that lies “clearly in the interests of both 
patients and physicians”52. A common result of malpractice suits is a physician with wavering 
self-assurance in clinical skills, causing discomfort to both provider and patient; liability 
protections are necessary in order to provide appropriate support for physicians acting in the 
patient’s best interest.  Appropriate reform efforts would include a focus on litigation that 
emphasizes avoiding medical errors and improving quality, while leaving punitive tasks to 
medical licensing boards.  In order to provide a venue for patients to bring viable claims of 
medical injury, some hospital systems are approaching the issue proactively with internal medical 
error disclosure systems; this allows facilities to assess patient safety and quality issues and 
provides settlements to patients when necessary52. Facilities implementing claims processes have 
seen medical malpractice suits decline up to 64 percent with much of the savings from 
malpractice suits being devoted to patient safety and quality efforts52. Significant malpractice 
reform would have the effect of allowing doctors to provide only the care that is appropriate, 
reducing the financial and administrative burden of malpractice protections, and discouraging 
lawyers with an affinity for filing frivolous claims and potential fraudsters looking to game the 
system for financial gain. The final product would yield more confident physicians with a focus 
on value-based care, decreased administrative complexity, and many related opportunities for 
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cost-containment. When addressing the issue of medical errors shifts from assigning blame to 
modifying processes of care, the result is a more efficient health care system with better patient 
outcomes.  
Finally, governing bodies have a duty to the health care consumer and provider to enforce 
transparency in medicine. This includes publishing of quality reports and availability of real costs 
of care in order to provide a basis for value-based decision-making processes between provider 
and patient. Appropriate insurance reform would include recommendations for communicating 
costs of care to patients in plain language thus eliminating a profound barrier to a patient’s self-
advocacy. Without this transparency, the health care market will go on unregulated with rampant 
pricing failures and continued inflation.  
 
Provider Responsibility 
While physicians are deserving of protections and professional courtesies, they also have 
a responsibility to be accountable not only to their patients, but to each other. As a profession, 
physicians need to encourage a cultural shift toward appropriate, value-based care. Care is 
deemed inappropriate if a there is “no scientific basis on which to predict benefit” for a particular 
patient53. Most physicians are likely guilty of delivering inappropriate care at some time in their 
careers due to outdated treatments with no proven efficacy, to avoid liability, or due to pressure 
from patients to act despite supporting evidence of an effective treatment option. Focus on 
delivery of appropriate care is perhaps the single most important factor of clinical practice in the 
battle to control health care spending as it not only provides the benefits of effective care, but also 
avoids the costly, unfortunate burdens of medical errors caused by inappropriate care.  
Tools to guide physicians in the practice of appropriate care have been in existence for 
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nearly three decades, yet still require complete implementation; RAND Corp has developed a 
detailed set of clinical indications, assigning each indication a 9-point scale appropriateness (9 
being very appropriate, 1 being extremely inappropriate)54,55. These indications cited very precise 
clinical values, such as the degree of occlusion demonstrated via angiography for determining the 
appropriateness of ipsilateral versus contralateral approach for carotidendarterectomy54. The 9-
point scale used for each indication for a specific procedure then culminates with a final 
recommendation that can land in one of three categories: (1) the procedure should not be done; 
(2) performing the procedure is questionable; or (3) the procedure is indicated and should be 
performed54. This approach to appropriateness of care should be adopted for each clinical 
decision in order to combat this area of weakness in today’s volume-driven system. One such 
initiative to encourage this methodology, and bring patients in on the discussion, has been 
adopted by the Choosing Wisely campaign.  
 
Choosing Wisely Campaign 
The Choosing Wisely campaign is an initiative of the ABIM Foundation, a non-profit 
offshoot of the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM), “to help physicians and patients 
engage in conversations to reduce overuse of tests and procedures, and support physician efforts 
to help patients make smart and effective care choices”56. Over 40 subspecialty professional 
societies have joined the campaign since its inception in 2012 by creating lists of common 
practices that, while status quo, might not actually yield any benefit to the patient or provide 
valuable information to providers (Figure 4)56. These lists encourage physicians and patients to 
dialogue about the most valuable and effective care plan rather than passively accepting what is 
common for what is right.  
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 The lists of questionable actions are well designed for the fast pace of a typical 
physician’s office. They are concise, consisting of merely five common practices to be questioned 
in the specialty of the specific professional society. They set attainable goals, citing precise 
clinical thresholds for when the practice might deserve further consideration (e.g., if the patient 
has a greater than 10 percent risk of developing cardiac disease in the next ten years, 
electrocardiogram testing might be a relevant screening measure for an asymptomatic 
individual)56. Importantly, the lists are also specific and, through provider surveys, the influence 
of the lists is measurable. Measurable data of the initiative’s impact is invaluable as it has the 
potential to demonstrate convincing evidence that small changes in the culture of physician 
practices can have drastic influence on health spending and our ability to provide appropriate and 
accountable care.  
 The “Five Things” lists, as they have been dubbed, are typically written in scientific 
language, with clinical markers and medical terminology that might prove difficult to understand 
by the average patient. In order to engage the patient in the discussion, the Choosing Wisely 
campaign provides patient educational tools that complement the “Five Things” lists. These tools 
give further explanation of medical terms in plain language, inform patients of both health risks 
and financial risks of pursuing a treatment that lacks evidence-based justification, provide 
guidelines for signs and symptoms that would warrant further consideration, and suggest 
alternative measures for managing their condition and tracking their health.  
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Figure 4. Choosing Wisely: Five Things Physicians and Patients Should Question in Internal 
Medicine. A “Five Things” list devised by the American College of Physicians to guide Internal Medicine 
physicians in their practice of value-based, appropriate care. “Five Things” lists are part of the Choosing 
Wisely campaign of the ABIM Foundation to encourage the practice of evidence-based medicine and 
provide higher-quality, cost-containing health services and to engage patients in the discussion of their 
care. Similar lists have been constructed by other professional societies for the broad spectrum of medical 
specialties. ACP is American College of Physicians. Figure taken from Choosing Wisely56. 
 
The challenge with this initiative seems to be in disseminating the information to patients 
and collecting data to determine efficacy. Currently, several consumer-oriented organizations, 
such as AARP and Leapfrog Group, have partnered with the ABIM Foundation to help spread the 
word56. Considering the potential impact this type of patient education could have, and the missed 
opportunities for preventative measures by prolonging a patient’s first encounter with the 
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information until a doctor’s visit, it is imminently necessary to find innovative ways of educating 
patients. For the Choosing Wisely patient education tools to achieve their full potential influence, 
the ABIM Foundation should expand their partnerships and, importantly, recruit public health 
organizations, to broadcast the tools in a variety of interfaces—public transit hubs, schools, 
sporting venues, and highly trafficked websites, to name a few. The ABIM Foundation should 
also construct data collection interfaces to allow physicians to report their use of the Five Things 
lists and how, if at all, the lists impacted their clinical decisions.  
 
Consumer Responsibility 
 A fundamentally crucial aspect of consumer responsibility is participation in the 
insurance system through compliance with the individual mandate. This not only serves the 
patient’s best interest, but is also an obligation of every citizen in order to protect the interests of 
neighbor and nation. Likewise, the consumer has a personal duty to prioritize one’s health. This is 
certainly a controversial issue, as ownership of self is a constitutionally protected right, however, 
when one’s own health and costs of care affect that of others, it becomes necessary to consider 
personal health actions and their influence on the health and prosperity of others. Just as one must 
consider your neighbor in the issue of a noise complaint, it should be the responsibility of a 
patient to consider the burden placed on his fellow citizen by his own neglect of his personal 
health status. If he has been afforded the opportunity to attain insurance coverage and has been 
offered the education and tools necessary to form positive health behaviors, and yet continues to 
rest on public systems to pick up the bill for poor health decisions, why should he not incur a 
penalty for such indifference?  
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 As a nation, trends in obesity and cardiac disease are proof of such neglect for personal 
health. While local governments have the responsibility to invest in preventative care efforts and 
population health, the task of the patient is to participate and take advantage of opportunities for 
personal health improvements. This includes engaging in discussions of treatment plans and care 
options with the patient’s health care team, in addition to establishing a relationship with a 
primary care provider. The PCP should fully replace emergency department visits for all non-
acute care needs in order for this relationship to function properly; this requires timely access to 
PCP office visits, but also on patient action, follow-through, and compliance with the agree-upon 
care plan. Finally, as a consumer, it is paramount that patients take a more proactive role to 
understand the costs of their care. They must begin to demand transparency in billing procedures, 
to ask about cost prior to receiving treatment rather than passively accepting care with no concept 
of pricing, and to refuse care if they determine the asking price does not reflect the true value of 
the service. Without this patient interaction in the health care market, inflated rates for medical 
devices and procedures will continue to poison the health industry and diminish competition in 
the field. As more attentive consumers, patients have an unrealized power to affect the trajectory 
of US health spending.  
 
Importance of Primary Care 
Finally, an aspect of critical importance is the insufficient emphasis on primary care in 
the broader culture of US health care. This neglect is perpetuated by perverse economic 
incentives that devalue this field in the eyes of medical school graduates where the substantial 
burdens of education loans encourage emerging residents to select more lucrative specialties in 
order to escape the debt incurred. While this systemic flaw has received increasing attention from 
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lawmakers of late, there is a persistent need to educate the patient population on the importance 
of primary care. ACOs would be wise to focus efforts on developing more aggressive means of 
distributing preventative care services and to engage organizations such as the Leap Frog Group 
in discussions of how best the public can be educated to take control of their own health.	  	  
It has been shown time and time again that populations with access to care that 
emphasizes primary health care benefit in two ways: (1) the overall health of the population is 
better than regions with less primary health care, and (2) patients who actively participate in 
primary health care have better health outcomes57.  The ACO model has the potential to address 
the need for improved relationships between PCPs and their patient population; if PCPs take full 
advantage of the incentives to strengthen their management of population health and to improve 
the health literacy of their patients, ACOs could see promising results in cost-containment efforts.  
 
While the ACO model remains largely untested and requires considerable attention of 
health care administrators and legislators, the fiscal realities facing the US health care system 
demand a thorough investigation into the realistic results the ACO model may deliver. At this 
juncture, there appear to be few hopeful options for answering the needs of the health care 
market. Therefore, it is in the best interest of all US citizens to devote the necessary efforts to 
supporting the full development of the ACO model and its integration into the US health care 
system. While the ACO model has the potential to address issues in coordination, quality, and 
cost-containment, full participation of all parties is essential to the success of the model and to 
delivering our nation out of its current fiscal dilemma.  
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